Department of Engineering | Industrial and Systems Engineering
Hometown: Tucson, AZ
Protecting against intentional attacks on homeland security is fundamentally different from protecting against accidents or acts of nature. In particular, an intelligent and adaptable adversary may adopt a different offensive strategy in response to our protective security measures, in order to circumvent or disable them. Game theory provides a way of taking this into account. Thus, security can benefit from game-theoretic methods. This talk discusses approaches for applying game theory to the problem of defending systems against attack. The results yield insights into the nature of optimal defensive investments.
Approximate Length of Talk: variable length
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